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The shape of the banking union confirms Berlin’s privileged 
position in the eurozone
Konrad Popławski
On 18 December 2013, EU finance ministers reached agreement on the structure of a banking 
union. The body will be tasked with oversight of the largest banks across the EU. It will also 
devise recovery and resolution programmes for institutions at risk of bankruptcy, and it will 
handle wind-up arrangements and decide on the allocation of resulting costs. The proposals 
are expected to be approved by March of this year by the governments of the eurozone sta-
tes, by other EU members interested in joining the banking union, and by the European Par-
liament. A compromise on the supervision of the largest banks in the eurozone was reached 
several months ago. The most recent negotiations focused on the second pillar of the banking 
union: a Single Resolution Mechanism. The parties successfully negotiated a set of procedures 
for rescuing banks capable of recovery and for the closure of institutions that cannot be re-
scued. A joint position was also agreed on the allocation of costs resulting from such actions.
The recent financial crisis has revealed the diffi-
culties faced by many national governments try-
ing to oversee the banks upon whose loans they 
remain dependent. As a result, the main objective 
of the banking union has been to transfer not only 
the supervisory responsibilities, but also the bur-
den of rescue or closure costs from the national 
to the EU level. This would place the EU financial 
sector under greater scrutiny, and give national 
governments room for manoeuvre in crisis situ-
ations. However, these objectives have been only 
partially achieved. The banking union introduces 
a new institution with extensive supranational su-
pervisory powers over major banks, namely the 
Single Resolution Board. Moreover, bank restruc-
turing is to be financed mainly through a levy 
paid by financial sector actors in individual states. 
Initially, the money is to be collected in national 
pots for local use, and only later are the funds to 
be pooled at the European level. 
This formula strengthens Germany’s position. In 
the event of the financial failure of a large insti-
tution (and insufficient EU funds to address the 
problem), Germany – as the country with the 
largest financial reserves – would be able to loan 
the necessary funds from its national pot. Ger-
many would also hold a key vote on loan applica-
tions to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
That is because, together with France, Germany 
is a major capital contributor to the ESM, which 
gives it a veto over the agency’s loan decisions. 
In addition, ESM interventions would have to be 
approved by the Bundestag. Since the German 
financial sector will be making the greatest con-
tribution to the Single Resolution Mechanism, 
Berlin will also have a decisive say in any work on 
future restructuring plans. Importantly, thanks 
to its strong economy, Germany will be able to 
rescue its local banks without resorting to out-
side help. Germany has therefore managed to 
achieve its main objective, namely to gain control 
over the restructuring of European banks and to 
impose a series of safety mechanisms on the use 
of German money to this end. However, this has 
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significantly complicated the new system, and 
has raised questions about the ability to work 
out a compromise should a large eurozone bank 
need rescuing in the future.
The structure of the banking union
The decision to form the banking union is a re-
sponse to the diagnosis of one of the causes of 
the current economic crisis, namely the lack of ad-
equate controls over banking institutions, which 
stems from the dependence of some national 
governments on the sale of bonds to these banks. 
Financial institutions which collect deposits from 
the public have in the past engaged in high-risk 
speculative transactions, exposing depositors to 
potential losses in the event of bankruptcy. In ad-
dition, the national supervisory bodies have not 
always been able to fully control the risks taken 
by banks operating in a number of EU countries.
Under the existing proposal, the banking union is 
to consist of three pillars. The first pillar (the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism) will give the European 
Central Bank supervisory powers over the largest 
banking groups, and it will come into operation 
in November of this year. The second pillar (the 
Single Resolution Mechanism) envisages the cre-
ation of a European institution which from 2015 
would have the powers to devise recovery plans 
for banks and to wind up failing institutions. The 
third pillar (the Single Resolution Fund) is a pool 
of money to be used for the restructuring of 
banks in countries which are unable to meet the 
cost of the process themselves. The ratification of 
an intergovernmental agreement on the estab-
lishment of the fund by countries representing at 
least 80% of capital contributions is a pre-condi-
tion for the implementation of the second pillar.
The creation of the banking union is based on 
a series of legal provisions. Article 114 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU serves as 
the legal basis for the first and second pillar, and 
the drafting of relevant EU directives is already 
in progress. The third pillar, meanwhile, is to be 
based on an intergovernmental agreement.
All eurozone members are obliged to partici-
pate in the banking union, while other EU coun-
tries are able to join the new regime voluntarily.
Procedures for restructuring banks 
The second pillar – the Single Resolution Mech-
anism – envisages the creation of a resolution 
fund made up of bank contributions amounting 
to €55 billion over the next 10 years. At first, 
the funds will be collected in separate nation-
al pots, and will be used to rescue only those 
banks which are based in the country where 
the contributions originated. Over time, how-
ever, the contributions will be gradually pooled 
together by transferring some of the funds 
from the national pots to a ‘common’ fund en-
abling the restructuring of any eurozone bank. 
By 2026, all of the contributions are to be paid 
into the pooled eurozone fund.
The ministers have also drawn up a set of rules 
– coming into effect in 2016 – governing the 
order in which losses incurred in the restructur-
ing process should be covered. The liabilities of 
rescued banks are to be met, first by the bank’s 
creditors and shareholders, followed by the hold-
ers of bonds in excess of €100,000, and finally 
(in the absence of sufficient funds) by the Single 
Resolution Fund. During the transitional period, 
additional funds required to rescue a bank could 
be obtained through government loans from the 
reserves built up in national pots. Germany has 
reluctantly agreed that countries should also be 
allowed to apply for a European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM) loan, but it has refused to simplify the 
procedures set for banks seeking EMS loans.
The decision to form the banking union is 
a response to the diagnosis of one of the 
causes of the current economic crisis, 
namely the lack of adequate controls over 
banking institutions, which stems from 
the dependence of some national govern-
ments on the sale of bonds to these banks.
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The restructuring procedure also envisages es-
tablishing a Single Resolution Board, consisting 
of representatives appointed by financial super-
visory authorities from individual countries. Its 
task will be to devise a resolution plan for any 
bank considered to be at risk of bankruptcy. Such 
a plan would need to be approved by two-thirds 
of the board’s members, representing at least 
two-thirds of the capital paid into the resolution 
fund. The plan would then form the basis for the 
restructuring of the bank in question, unless with-
in 24 hours, and at the request of the European 
Commission, the Council of the European Union 
decides to veto the plan (by a simple majority) 
or proposes changes to the plan. In order not to 
infringe on the budgetary powers of individual 
member states, the Single Resolution Board will 
not be able to force any state to rescue a financial 
institution using taxpayers’ money.
Conclusions
• The proposed compromise on the banking 
union slightly simplifies and accelerates the pro-
cess of bank restructuring, addressing the recent 
calls made by a number of politicians and econ-
omists, including ECB president Mario Draghi. 
However, the main unresolved problem is the fact 
that the pot of funds made available under the 
new regime is too small. It is estimated that the 
current crisis has consumed €1.6 trillion, and some 
estimates suggest that banks may have around 
€1 trillion of non-performing loans. In this con-
text, the €500 billion available under the ESM, and 
the €55 billion reserve fund, represent an amount 
far too small to give the banking union the credi-
bility it needs – €55 billion might only be enough 
to rescue two medium-sized banks. Consequent-
ly, the proposed compromise on the banking 
union should not be seen as a breakthrough. If 
the banking crisis were to worsen, finding a way 
to refinance failing institutions would require 
time-consuming negotiations. According to an 
analysis carried out by the Financial Times, in the 
event of disagreement, a decision on a resolution 
plan for a single bank could require 143 votes by 
nine committees. Meanwhile, the experience of 
the crisis in Cyprus shows that the entire process 
would need to take no longer than a few days. 
• The compromised proposal maintains Ger-
many’s control over bank restructuring across 
the eurozone, as well as over the direction of 
reforms in member states experiencing eco-
nomic problems. Any restructuring plan can be 
vetoed by members contributing a third of the 
capital. Germany, which holds between 18.8% 
and 25.7% of the capital (depending on the 
number of EU countries that choose to enter 
the banking union and on the amount of capital 
they contribute) will in effect be able to block 
any solutions it deems unfavourable. At the Eu-
ropean Council level, however, where a simple 
majority of votes will be required, Germany’s 
positioned will be notably weaker. Similarly, any 
restructuring loans made available through the 
ESM, or through German deposits, will allow 
Berlin to determine the direction of reforms in 
the countries requesting such assistance. Ger-
many could also potentially exert influence on 
eurozone members on other matters that the 
German government is particularly interested in 
(one such example could be the pressure put on 
Ireland to vote against limits on CO2 emissions in 
cars, which was widely reported in the European 
press in July 2013). Nonetheless, the final pro-
posal for the banking union does include Germa-
ny’s concession to gradually pool together the 
reserve funds, although specific provisions on 
how this will be achieved have yet to be agreed. 
Germany has also in principle approved the use 
of ESM funds, although it should be stressed that 
The proposed compromise on the bank-
ing union should not be seen as a break-
through. If the banking crisis were to 
worsen, finding a way to refinance fail-
ing institutions would require time- 
-consuming negotiations.
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individual decisions in this regard will be hard 
to pass should Germany choose to block them. 
• It is possible that following the introduction of 
the banking union, the position of banks from 
southern Europe could be weakened due to low 
confidence levels among investors. These banks 
have already been struggling to find sources of fi-
nance for their investment, and now they will also 
have to bear the costs associated with the accu-
mulation of reserves for restructuring. Many coun-
tries do not currently have sufficient resources in 
their deposit guarantee schemes. Consequently, 
for the foreseeable future, these states may have 
no choice but to seek assistance from the Europe-
an Central Bank. The probability of such course of 
events has increased the decision of the US Feder-
al Reserve announced in December, to slowly ta-
per off its quantitative easing policy – that is, the 
policy of purchasing large amounts of US Treasury 
notes by the US Central Bank, which has been the 
main source of substantial additional capital in fi-
nancial markets and has increased interest in Eu-
ropean bonds in recent years. In addition, the pro-
posal leaves an element of uncertainty about the 
extent to which owners of large deposits will be 
liable for banks’ debts. For this reason, such de-
positors are likely to spread their savings between 
several banks to avoid exceeding the €100,000 
deposits guaranteed by the EU. The potential 
weakening of the financial condition of European 
banks could also have an impact on Poland. The 
Polish financial sector could experience a drop in 
a share of foreign capital as many Eurozone banks 
may have problems holding their assets in Polish 
financial institutes.
• The analysis also needs to stress the reposition-
ing of the main political actors following the cri-
sis across the eurozone over the past few years. 
The negotiations on the banking union have con-
firmed that Germany has emerged as an undis-
puted leader within the EU. France’s contribution 
to the debate has been rather weak, and per-
ceived as a voice of one of the countries from the 
‘weakened South’. The course of the negotiations 
has also exposed the relatively weak position en-
joyed by the European Commission vis-à-vis that 
of the national governments, calling its role as 
a decision-maker into question. It remains to be 
seen whether the European Parliament will want 
to and will be able to shape the final draft of the 
agreement in any discernible way. The parliament 
will nonetheless find itself under considerable 
pressure to adopt the relevant directives as soon 
as possible, before its current terms ends in May 
and the balance of power changes after the elec-
tions, which are likely to result in a more euro-
sceptic chamber.
The structure of the banking union itself will 
also change the power relations between the 
different EU institutions. Its establishment will 
create a completely new and powerful actor in 
the form of the Single Resolution Board, and it 
will strengthen the position of the ECB thanks 
to the bank’s new supervisory powers. The role 
of the European Commission within the bank-
ing union will be restricted to purely techno-
cratic measures (such as requesting the Council 
of the EU to change its decisions on restructur-
ing plans for banks). Meanwhile, the European 
Parliament is unlikely to have any powers to in-
tervene on issues relating to bank restructuring.
